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STATEMENT OF THE CASF
Nature of the Case
Freddie Anthony Naranjo

from the district court's denial of his motion to

and his motion to reconsider his motion to suppress. In the district court, he
that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because probable cause to
search the vehicle he was driving was established only as a result of a police dog
improperly entering that vehicle. The district court denied the motions. After a jury trial,
Mr. Naranjo was found guilty of one count of possession of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine. Mr. Naranjo
motion to

that the district court erred when it denied his

his motion to reconsider.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Twin Falls Police Officer Kevin Loosli was dispatched to assist a Twin Falls
Sheriff's Deputy who had stopped Mr. Naranjo for speeding. (Tr. 11/16/12, p.5, L.26
p.7, L.2.) After arriving on scene, Officer Loosli deployed his canine (Rocky) to perform
a "free air sniff" around the truck that Mr. Naranjo was driving. (Tr. 7/2/13, p.16, Ls.2-5.)
Rocky was on a leash that was approximately 36-40 inches long, and Officer Loosli
confirmed that he was in control of the dog. (Tr. 7/2/13, p.8, Ls.8-13.) The driver's side
window of the truck was open and, as Rocky was sniffing the door seam, he moved and
put his head inside the truck through the open window. (Tr. 11/16/12, p.14, L.21 -p.15,
L.9, Tr. 7/2/13, p.16, Ls.12-15.) Immediately after putting his head in the truck, Rocky
alerted.

(Tr. 7/2/13, p.16, Ls.13-16.).

The district court found that this action

established probable cause to search the truck. (Tr. 7/2/13, p.16, Ls.17-22.) During the
search, Officer Loosli discovered a digital scale and a plastic bag. (R., p.16.) He said
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that the scale had a "white crystal substance" on it, which tested presumptively positive
for methamphetamine, so he arrested Mr. Naranjo for possession of methamphetamine.
(R., p.16.)
Mr. Naranjo was originally charged with one count of possession of a controlled
substance, methamphetamine, and an enhancement based on the fact that this charge
was a second offense of the uniform controlled substance act.

(R., pp.64-67.)

He

pleaded not guilty, and, prior to trial, he filed a motion to suppress and memorandum in
support of that motion. (R., pp.157-163.) He argued that the car search violated his
Fourth Amendment rights because Rocky's alert vehicle -

the probable cause to search the

did not arise until after the dog entered the car. (R., pp.157-163.) After a

hearing, the district court denied his motion to suppress because it found that the
actions of Officer Loosli did not facilitate or encourage Rocky's entry into Mr. Naranjo's
truck, and Rocky's "instinctive actions" did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
(Tr. 7/2/13, p.20, L.3- p.21, L.19; R., pp.195-196.)
Later, Mr. Naranjo filed a memorandum in support of a motion to reconsider his
motion to suppress.

(R., pp.226-232.) At the hearing on that motion, Mr. Naranjo's

counsel played a DVD that showed Officer Loosli and Rocky performing a sniff of
another car where Rocky also put his head in the window after putting his paws on the
window sill.

(See Defendant's Exhibit A, Title 2, Ch.7.) Additionally, a drug canine

expert testified about the DVD and indicated that Officer Loosli was encouraging
Rocky's actions during the sniff depicted on the DVD.

(Tr. 12/17/13, p.27, Ls.4-25.)

Nevertheless, the district court denied the motion to reconsider. (Tr. 12/17/13, p.58, L.1
- p.59, L.20; R., pp.257-258.) It reiterated its original finding that Officer Loosli "never
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did anything to, of his own volition, direct the dog inside the vehicle by orchestrating,
facilitating, or directing the dog to go inside." (Tr. 12/17/13, p.58, Ls.3-7.) It also cited
to several federal circuit court of appeals cases, which held that when an officer does
nothing to encourage or facilitate a canine's entry into a vehicle, and the entry is the
result of a "canine's instinctive actions," a dog's entry is not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. (Tr. 12/17/13, p.58, L.13- p.59, L.20.)
After a trial, Mr. Naranjo was found guilty of possession of a controlled
substance, methamphetamine.

(Tr. 1/8/14, p.334, Ls.7-21.)

guilty to the charged enhancement.

Thereafter, he pleaded

(Tr. 1/8/14, p.337, Ls.8-13.)

The district court

imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, but suspended the
sentence and placed Mr. Naranjo on probation for "a period of five year(s) or until all
court costs, fines, and restitution are paid, whichever is longer.... " (R., pp.324-329.)
Mr. Naranjo filed a Notice of Appeal that was timely from the judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.337-340.)

3

cause
was
only as
result of Officer Loosli's canine partner entering Mr. Naranjo's vehicle, did the district
court err when it denied Mr. Naranjo's motion to suppress and his motion to reconsider?
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ARGUMENT
Because Probable Cause To Search Mr. Naranjo's Vehicle Was Established Only As A
Result Of Officer Loosli's Canine Partner Entering Mr. Naranio's Vehicle, The District
Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Naranio's Motion To Suppress And His Motion To
Reconsider

A.

Introduction
The district court erred when it denied Mr. Naranjo's motion to suppress and his

motion to reconsider because Officer Loosli's dog put its head inside the window of the
vehicle before it ever alerted on the vehicle. Citizens have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in

contents of their car.

othervvise, in

B.

Allowing any entry into a vehicle, canine or

to establish probable cause to search the car is unconstitutional.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court employs a bifurcated

standard. State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 708 (Ct. App. 1998). The Court accepts the
trial court's determination of fact if supported by substantial evidence and freely reviews
"the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." Id.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Naranjo's Motion To Suppress
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section

17 of the Idaho Constitution protect "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17. Thus a warrant is generally required to
conduct a search.

"Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable and the

State bears the burden to demonstrate that a warrantless search either fell within a well-
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recognizecl exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the
circumstances."

State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426, 431 (Ct. App. 1996) (citation

omitted). Accordingly, "searches and seizures 'conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated
exceptions."' Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (quoting Thompson v.
Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1984)).

The United States Supreme Court has held that when evidence is obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the judicially developed exclusionary rule usually
precludes its use in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and
seizure. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961 ); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).

In this case, the district court erred in not suppressing the results of the search of
Mr. Naranjo's car because none of the permissible exceptions to the requirement of a
warrant applied. Probable cause to enter into a vehicle cannot arise after a warrantless
entry into a vehicle. Here, it is undisputed that the dog's alert occurred after the dog's
entry into Mr. Naranjo's vehicle. In all of the cases relied on by the district court, the
dogs exhibited behavior outside the defendants' vehicles before entering the vehicles.
In this case, the district court relied on the dog's "instinctive" action in allowing his entry
into the vehicle, but there is no "animal instinct" exception to the requirement of a
warrant. Finally, recent United States Supreme Court precedent supports a finding that
the conduct in this case was an impermissible intrusion into Mr. Naranjo's property.
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Because the dog's entry into the vehicle was warrantless, the fruits of the ensuing
search must be excluded.

1.

Officer Loosli's Drug Dog's Entry Into Mr. Naranjo's Vehicle Constituted
An Illegal Search Because The Dog Never Alerted Outside The Vehicle

When a drug-sniffing dog infringes upon a "constitutionally protected interest in
privacy" by entering a car before probable cause is established, an unlawful search has
occurred. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) (holding that a dog sniff
performed "on the exterior of respondent's car" was not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment and noting "unless the dog sniff itself infringed respondent's constitutionally
protected interest in privacy.") As a general rule, "[a] dog sniff along the outside of a
motor vehicle does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment."

State v.

Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363, 17 P.3d 301, 307 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (emphasis added)).

Once an officer has

stopped a vehicle, a subsequent investigation "can ripen into probable cause as soon
as a drug detection dog alerts on the exterior of the vehicle, justifying a search of the
vehicle without the necessity of a warrant" based on the automobile exception. State v.
Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 843 (1999) (citing State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898 (1992)

(emphasis added)).

Therefore, only a dog's alert on the outside can provide the

probable cause necessary to overcome the requirement of a warrant to search the
inside. In this case, Rocky never alerted before entering the vehicle, so there was no
probable cause prior to the entry, and thus the entry was illegal.
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a.

All The Cases Relied On By The District In Reaching Its Holding
Are Factually Distinguishable Because Of The Dogs' Behavior
Outside The Vehicle In Those Cases

In denying Mr. Naranjo's motions, the district court relied on a line of federal
circuit court of appeals cases that began with United States. v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359
(10th Cir. 1989). (See Tr. 7/2/13, p.18, L.8-p.21, L.19, Tr. 12/17/13, p.58, L.13- p.59,
L.14.)

In Stone, the Tenth Circuit ruled that a trained canine's instinctive action of

entering vehicle after detecting an odor did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
364. And the later cases, which followed Stone, relied on by the district court also found
that a canine's entry after detecting an odor were permissible. See United States v.

Lyons, 486 F.3d 367 (8th Cir. 2007) and United States v. Pierce, 622F.3d 209 (3d Cir.
2010). These cases are not only unsupported by United States Supreme Court
authority, they are factually distinguishable from this case.
In particular, in Stone, the Court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion
because of the dog's behavior outside the vehicle. Stone, 866 F.2d at 364. In Stone,
the dog jumped in an open hatchback of a car and "keyed" on a duffel bag after being
let off his leash because he was circling the car and showing "interest underneath the
rear area of the car and at the passenger door." Id. at 361. The Court specifically noted
that "[e]ven though the police could use a trained dog to sniff the exterior of Stone's
automobile, the dog created a troubling issue under the Fourth Amendment when it
entered the hatchback. People have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the interiors
of their automobiles; police may not search an automobile unless they have probable
cause to believe it contains contraband." Id. at 363 (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United
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States, 413 U.S. 266, 269-270 (1973) ("Automobile or no automobile, there must be

probable cause for the search.")).
The Tenth Circuit ultimately held that "the dog's instinctive actions did not violate
the Fourth Amendment" expressly because the dog's behavior during his sniff of the
exterior of the vehicle gave the officers reasonable suspicion. Id. at 364. The Court
held that allowing the dog to enter the vehicle was permissible because of that
reasonable suspicion. Id. Thus, as Mr. Naranjo's counsel pointed out below, Stone is
not on point because there it was clear that the dog was already focused on an odor
that was "emanating" from the vehicle, and that fact was crucial to the Court's decision.
Id. at 363-64.

The importance of this factual distinction was underscored in a later case, where
the Tenth Circuit explained that its holding in Stone was limited to cases where the
officers already have reasonable suspicion the vehicle contains narcotics. See United
States v. Winningham, 140 F.3d 1328, 1331 (10th Cir. 1998).

In Winningham, the

defendant's vehicle was stopped on reasonable suspicion that it contained illegal aliens.
A visual search of the interior of the vehicle revealed nothing to the officers, who then
detained the driver for 5 to 6 minutes while waiting for a canine, which ultimately alerted
on a vehicle vent, whereupon narcotics were discovered. Id. at 1329. The Tenth Circuit
affirmed the suppression of the evidence, finding that it violated the Fourth Amendment,
and specifically finding that Stone did not apply: "the officers in Stone acted under
reasonable suspicion, a circumstance underscored by our limited holding. Id. (holding,
'[i]n these circumstances, we think the police remained within the range of activities they
may permissibly engage in when they have reasonable suspicion to believe an

9

automobile contains narcotics."' Id. at 1331 (emphasis in original). Whether the officers

have reasonable suspicion of narcotics in the first place is key. The Court explained,
"[b)ecause the range of acceptable police activity in the absence of reasonable
suspicion may differ considerably from the range of acceptable police activity in the
presence of reasonable suspicion, we see no reason to find Stone controlling here.
Stone is therefore distinguishable on both factual and legal grounds and is not

controlling authority in this case."

Id.

In this case, because the police did not have

reasonable suspicion that Mr. Naranjo's vehicle contained narcotics prior to Rocky's
entry, Stone is inapposite here as well.
Similarly, in United States v. Lyons, 486 F.3d 367 (8th Cir. 2007), the Eighth
Circuit held that a canine's entry into a car was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment
because a video showed that the dog "alerted several times and nearly indicated to the
presence of narcotics" on its initial trip around the outside of the vehicle before it stuck
its head in the window and sat down by the front door. Id. at 370. The Court agreed
with the district court's finding that the police officer did not facilitate the entry. Id. at 373
And, notably, the Court of Appeals also agreed with the district court's "determination
that the dog would have ultimately indicated on the van even if he had not stuck his
head inside the window." Id.
Finally, in United States v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 2010), the Third Circuit
held that because the dog "alerted first to the exterior of Pierce's car" before he "entered
the front seat through the open driver's door and alerted in the areas of the passenger
seat and glove box," the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. Id. at
210 (emphasis added).

The Court said that the dog acted instinctively with no
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encouragement and concluded that the dog's "interior sniffs, as a natural migration from
his initial exterior sniffs, did not constitute a search requiring a warrant or probable

cause." Id. at 214-15 (emphasis added). It went on to say that "because the video and
testimony support the District Court's finding that Cole initially alerted to the outside of
Pierce's car in the area of the front passenger seat, the remand that Pierce is asking for
would inevitably result in a proforma exercise." Id. at 215.
The Pierce Court also mentioned that it found the district court's discussion in
United States v Hutchinson, 471 F. Supp.2d 497 (M.D. Pa. 2007) helpful. Id. at 213.

There, the district court concluded that the plain smell doctrine would apply because
"Zeus (the canine who entered the car in that case] made entry into the Grand Am after
smelling the odor of marijuana - an odor he first detected outside the vehicle before he
entered through the driver's window." Id. (emphasis added).
Finally, an Idaho case referenced by Mr. Naranjo's counsel is factually different
as well. Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement By and Through Richardson v. $34,000 U.S.
Currency, 121 Idaho 211 (Ct. App. 1991 ). There, while executing an inventory search,

a deputy walked a dog around the outside of the car, and "[w]hen the dog approached
the corner of the trunk, he 'alerted' or became excited as he had been trained to do
when detecting drugs." Id. at 213. The Court of Appeals held that the inventory search
was not rendered invalid when the dog jumped into the trunk because it "initially sniffed
the outside of the car and became excited when it detected a scent it apparently
recognized as marijuana, cocaine, or heroin" and then "disobeyed a command and
instinctively jumped inside when the trunk was opened .... " Id. The Court cited Stone
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for the proposition that a "dog instinctively jumping into open hatchback when smelling

drugs" did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. (emphasis added).
That is not what occurred here. Here, the district court never made a finding that
Rocky first detected an odor outside the vehicle. In fact, it impliedly found the opposite
to be true. The district court specifically said that the facts established "that there was
no probable cause prior to the dog putting his nose into the window." (Tr. 12/17/13,
p.16, Ls.17-19.)

Indeed, the district court noted that $34,000 U.S. Currency was

factually distinct from this case precisely because in that case probable cause arose
outside the vehicle, but it then found that to be a distinction without a difference.
(Tr. 7/2/13, p.18, Ls.13-24.)
In this case, when asked why Rocky stuck his head in the window, Officer Loosli
said "My dog typically, when he smells odor, will try to follow that odor to the source."
(Tr. 7/2/13, p.7, Ls.5-8.) But there was no finding that Rocky, unlike the dogs in Pierce
and Lyons, ever alerted outside the vehicle in response to any odor. Therefore, it is
evident that the only reason he alerted is because of what he smelled after he stuck his
head inside the window. The district court said that "as Officer Loosli was leading the
dog ... to the source or having the dog follow the source, he was directed ... to sniff
along the door seam." (Tr. 7/2/13, p.16, Ls.10-13.) The problem with this finding, and
this language, is that the facts make it clear that Rocky had not yet alerted or even
become excited, so there clearly was no "source" (as the word is used above) to follow
at that point, because Rocky did not detect any source of an odor until he put his head
in the window. Therefore, this situation is factually distinguishable from the cases the
district court relied on.
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b.

No Supreme Court Precedent Supports An "Animal Instinct"
Exception To The Fourth Amendment.

The district court's reliance on Stone, Lyons, and Pierce was also problematic
because that line of cases has a questionable underpinning. Indeed, in the case that
clearly represents the genesis for the "instinctive action rule," the Tenth Circuit provided
no legal reasoning or authority for its conclusion that a dog entering a car based on
instinct is not a search. United States. v. Stone, 866 F.2d at 364. Instead, it simply
agreed with the district court that made that same conclusion. Id. Many years later, in
Hutchinson, the court actually pointed out this omission, stating:

The Tenth Circuit did not provide any legal authority for its conclusion that
a dog sniff that took place within a vehicle does not violate the Fourth
Amendment if the dog's entry is found to be voluntary; likewise, the court
cited no authority for the tacit proposition that a dog sniff would be
rendered unlawful if the dog were placed in the vehicle or its entry
facilitated by law enforcement officers.
471 F. Supp.2d at 507.
In Hutchinson, however, the court crafted a rule that "where a canine makes
entry of its own accord due to its independent reaction to an odor emanating from the
car, the plain sniff rule would apply because the dog was not aided in its sniff by an
intervening officer and the dog detected the odor in an area in which it was lawfully
present." Id. at 510. The court based this rule on the "plain smell/plain view" doctrine.
Id. at 509.

But as Hutchinson notes, officers must be in a lawful location for those

doctrines to apply. Id. at 510. And inside the vehicle is not a lawful location. Therefore,
the rule can only apply when the canine alerts outside the vehicle.
In fact, following Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005), Idaho permits a trained
canine sniff around the vehicle if it does not extend the duration of the stop. State v.
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Silva, -134 Idaho 848, 852-853, 11 P.3d 44, 48-49 (Ct. App. 2000). But Caballes only
permits a dog sniff around the "exterior" of the vehicle. 543 U.S. at 409. It says nothing
about instinctive entries into the vehicle. The minimal intrusion theory relied on by the
Supreme Court in Caballes is limited to the exterior.
The problem with expanding the Hutchinson ruling is that doing so would create
a potential loophole for law enforcement because whether a dog's action is instinctive,
or trained, or facilitated is a very complex factual finding; courts are obviously not
trained in interpreting a dog's actions, and many times the dog sniff is not on video.
And if the rule depends on the dog being in a place where it has a lawful right to be in
order for the plain smell doctrine to apply, then it cannot enter the car before it alerts; it
must alert before it enters the car. The convenient explanation for an entry before an
alert is that canines, when they smell an odor, "will try to follow that odor to the source."
(Tr. 7/213, p.7, Ls.7-8.) This is what Officer Loosli said when asked why Rocky put his
head through the window. But this begs the question: if the dog smells an odor outside
the car, why wouldn't it alert at that point and be trained and/or restrained to never enter
the car unless specifically directed to do so?
Expanding the Hutchinson ruling, while not allowing police to blatantly "facilitate"
a car entry, would still allow police to give a dog enough leeway to enter an open
window and then simply claim that the dog was "following his smell to the source of the
odor." 1 But if this process begins with the dog smelling an odor outside of the car, this

1

The DVD that Mr. Naranjo's counsel showed at the hearing on the motion to
reconsider, and the testimony of the drug canine expert supports this. Even though the
video showed a different traffic stop, it was a good example of how Officer Loosli and
Rocky worked together, and one would hope that their protocol did not vary from stop to
stop. It is clear from the DVD that Rocky puts his head in the car as a result of Officer
14

should cause an alert, which would make entering the car unnecessary in the first place.
Once an alert occurred, and probable cause was established, a dog could enter the car
to assist law enforcement in finding the pinpoint source of that odor.

But given the

privacy and property interests in vehicles, canines should never be allowed to enter a
car unless probable cause is first established. This could be easily accomplished with
better training. And a bright line rule stating that dogs are never allowed in cars unless
and until probable cause is established would not only eliminate this kind of a gray area,
it would eliminate the need for the sort of credibility determinations that took place here.

2.

Recent United States Supreme Court Precedent Also Supports The
Conclusion That A Dog Cannot Enter, Or Even Touch, A Vehicle Prior To
Probable Cause Being Established

As Mr. Naranjo's counsel pointed out, in light of more recent United States
Supreme Court precedent, whether a dog can even touch a vehicle before probable
cause is established is now questionable.

(See Memorandum in Support of

Defendant's Motion to Reconsider, p.2.) Mr. Naranjo's counsel cited to the recent Ninth
Circuit case of United States v. Thomas, 726 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2013), where a drug
dog "jumped up and placed his paws on the vehicle and pressed his nose against
Thomas's toolbox." Id. at 1088. The Court said that "The government claims that it is
frivolous for Thomas to contend that the dog's contact with his truck was a Fourth

Loosli's actions because Officer Loosli put his hand inside the window several times.
(Defendant's Exhibit A, Title 2, Ch.7.) In fact, Mr. Falco-Jimenez, the expert witness
who testified regarding the DVD said that there were signs of "bad cueing" on Officer
Loosli's behalf. (Tr. 12/17/13, p.27, Ls.7-15.) And when asked whether Rocky entered
of his own volition, he said Officer Loosli "directed the dog to come up on the window
several times, both on the passenger side and the driver's side" and confirmed that
Officer Loosli was controlling Rocky's actions. (Tr. 12/17/13, p.27, Ls.16-25.)

15

Amendment search. After Jones and Jardines, his argument cannot be so easily
dismissed." Id. at 1092. 2
In United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), the United States Supreme
Court held that installing a GPS device on a citizen's private vehicle constituted a
search. Id. at 949. It said that "It is important to be clear about what occurred in this
case:

The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of

obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been
considered a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was
adopted" Id. Similarly, in Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013), the Court held
that the use of a drug dog on a home's curtilage constituted a search. The Court stated
"One virtue of the Fourth Amendment's property-rights baseline is that it keeps easy

cases easy. That the officers learned what they learned only by physically intruding on
Jardines' property to gather evidence is enough to establish that a search occurred." Id.
at 1417-18.
That is exactly what occurred here.

Officer Loosli discovered the evidence in

Mr. Naranjo's car only as a result of allowing Rocky to physically intrude on
Mr. Naranjo's truck. Rocky was on a leash and certainly could have been prevented
from putting his head in the truck. (See Tr. 11/16/12, p.14, Ls.11-15.) Thus, based on
both older and more recent United States Supreme Court precedent, it is clear that the
driver of a vehicle enjoys an expectation of privacy in a vehicle, and a vehicle is a piece
of property that is protected against trespass. If there is an odor and an alert outside a

2

The Ninth Circuit did not address the merits of this issue because it held that the
exclusionary rule did not apply due to the good faith exception. Id. at 1093.
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vehicle, a dog sniff can be constitutional.

If a dog enters a vehicle, for any reason,

including instinct, prior to the establishment of probable cause, United States Supreme
Court precedent makes that an unconstitutional search.

3.

Any Evidence Obtained As A Result Of The Illegal Search Of
Mr. Naranjo's Vehicle Must Be Suppressed As It Is Fruit Of Illegal
Government Activity

The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence is appropriate for
evidence that is the fruit of illegal government activity. Wong Sun v. United States, 371

U.S. 471 (1963); State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 249 (1990). The test is "whether,
granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is
made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged the primary taint."

Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 448.

Suppression is required if "the evidence sought to be suppressed would not have come
to light but for the government's unconstitutional conduct."

State v. Wigginton, 142

Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2005).
Here, Officer Loosli's dog illegally entered Mr. Naranjo's vehicle. This was an
impermissible search. Following that entry, the dog alerted, and then the officers

searched the vehicle and discovered the evidence. Therefore, that evidence must be
suppressed as fruit of the illegal governmental activity.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Naranjo respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's
judgment and commitment, reverse the order denying his motion to suppress, and

remand the case for a new trial.
DATED this 10th day of February, 2015.

REED P. ANDERSQN
Deputy State Appell~te Public Defender
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